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Abstract 
This paper analyses some long-run macroeconomic effects of European financial 
integration. In particular we focus on the further reduction and abolition of cross-
border barriers impeding the entry into the markets of banking and insurance 
products. We follow a theoretical as well as an empirical approach to make predictions 
about how deeper integration will affect growth and unemployment rates. In our 
growth model we show that enhanced foreign financial market penetration should 
increase the overall growth rate unambiguously. The empirical analysis includes a 
wide set of indicators, each of them capturing different aspects of financial 
development and financial market integration. On the basis of the estimations a weak 
growth impact of foreign market penetration can be identified. Hence, deeper 
financial integration generates a growth bonus. But the long-run growth effect is 
conditional on differences in institutional characteristics captured by country-specific 
effects. The analysis is supplemented by an analysis of the potential employment 
benefits of deeper financial integration. We show that the growth bonus can be 
transformed into an employment bonus, but also not without considering substantial 
country-specific differences. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the macroeconomic effects of further integration in the European 
markets for financial services. In particular we are interested in growth and unem-
ployment benefits of the reduction and abolition of cross-border barriers impeding the 
entry into the market of banking and insurance products. Usually, it is argued that 
facilitating the entry of foreign financial firms into the local market intensifies compe-
tition, improves efficiency, and increases the quality of the financial infrastructure. As 
such, foreign firms can be seen as an important catalyst for the sort of financial devel-
opment that promotes growth. 
 Our main research aim - evaluation of the change in the GDP growth rate and  
the change in the unemployment rate following deeper financial integration respec-
tively - is analogous to the CECCHINI Report in which the growth effects of the 1992 
Single Market Programme were estimated. In particular the CECCHINI Report predicted 
a bonus of 4.5 percent in terms of GDP growth, resulting from a free flow of consumer 
products, capital and labour. One third, or 1.5 percentage points of the growth bonus 
were attributed to the integration of financial markets in particular. Since 1992 the 
average growth rate of real GDP in Europe has not exceeded 2% per year. Hence the 
average growth rate equals the "equilibrium growth rate" or total factor productivity 
growth. Based on this observation we cannot exactly asses whether the expectation of 
the CECCHINI Report was too optimistic, however we can strengthen the arguments for 
further financial integration with new empirical results. We argue that the creation of 
a functioning single market for financial services is a substantial prerequisite for gen-
erating higher growth rates and reducing unemployment, because the degree to which 
financial markets are integrated is a determinant of financial development which in 
turn causes economic growth.  
The following section 2 analyses the connection between financial development 
and economic growth from a theoretical view. The approach is in line with the increas-
ing interest for the finance-growth nexus in recent publications (e.g. WORLD BANK, 
2001). It is argued that the level of financial development of an economy seems to be 
characterised mainly by it’s financial market’s size, structure and efficiency and 
through these transmission channels influences economic growth. We implement this 
characterisation of the financial sector in a simple endogenous growth model. This 
model can be used to illustrate the influence of financial development on the overall 
growth rate of an economy as well as the growth effects of financial integration.  
In section 3, major steps towards an integrated financial market in Europe are 
summarised and confronted with the empirical evidence. This descriptive analysis of 
foreign market penetration in banking and insurance markets already reveals the exis-
tence of substantial obstacles to cross-border business. Some attempts to abolish these 
obstacles are implemented in the Financial Services Action Plan in which the Euro-
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pean Commission formulates policy priorities for pushing financial integration. The 
elements of the Financial Services Action Plan are also briefly discussed.  
In the econometric evaluation in section 4, we try to assess the macroeconomic 
impact of an increased activity of foreign companies in domestic financial markets in 
Europe. The analysis of the EU member states follows a three-step approach.  
In a first step, we estimate a growth equation with typical "growth determinants" 
- investment rate and population growth - and different indicators of financial market 
development on the right-hand side. The panel data estimation results of the first step 
reveal country-specific regression constants which can be interpreted as total factor 
productivity growth rates. Obviously, not all indicators are suitable to show the influ-
ence the financial sector has on the real economy. In consequence, we obtain the con-
stants from the regression, which fits the data best. These constants - the country-
specific growth rates of total factor productivity - are defined as dependent variables in 
the second estimation step.  
To estimate the extent to which European financial integration has influenced 
total factor productivity growth we utilise a simple cross-country regression approach. 
Analogous to the first step, we estimate a number of equations with different financial 
integration indicators and control variables on the right-hand side. The regression re-
sults provide ambiguous evidence for a correlation between financial market integra-
tion and total factor productivity growth. However, it is possible to identify a weak in-
fluence of foreign market penetration in the sector for banking products. Hence, 
deeper financial integration generates a growth bonus. In the context of  theoretical 
examinations this growth bonus does not only mean a more rapid convergence to the 
steady state ("neoclassical growth effect") but also a higher equilibrium growth rate in 
the long run ("endogenous growth effect").  
In a third step, the analysis of the macroeconomic growth effects is supple-
mented with an analysis of the link between financial integration and unemployment. 
To asses the potential benefits of a fostered financial integration we estimate country-
specific OKUN-coefficients that provide information about the growth rate  a country 
needs in order to reduce unemployment. We show that a convincing increase in finan-
cial market integration is required to generate a growth bonus that can substantially 
reduce unemployment in the EU member states.  
Section 5 provides a conclusion and points to some aspects of the estimation re-
sults and their further interpretation that must be seen with considerable reservation.  
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2. Financial development, financial integration and 
economic growth 
This section outlines selective links between financial market development and the 
real economic sector. In particular it shows which transmission channels of the finan-
cial sector can be identified. The different approaches to finding causal combinations 
between the financial market development of an economy and its per-capita growth 
rate were motivated by two factors: the upcoming of the "new growth theory" and the 
detection of empirical phenomena such as the identification of specific convergence 
processes in the world economy.1 The finance-growth nexus in a closed economy is dis-
cussed extensively in the literature. In contrast, theoretical approaches to determine 
the growth implications of financial market integration are rare. Our aim is not to re-
move this shortcoming but to give some intuitive indications on the basis of a simple 
growth model. We argue that the removal of obstacles to cross-border financial activi-
ties is a substantial prerequisite for generating higher growth rates because the degree 
to which financial markets are integrated is a determinant of financial development 
which in turn influences economic growth.  
 
2.1 Transmission channels of the financial sector 
In growth theory the evolution of the financial services sector as a whole represents 
only one determinant of country-specific differences in growth processes. Nevertheless, 
the financial sector appears to have special importance in two ways. First, the finan-
cial sector has the function to canalise savings into investment and innovation activi-
ties.2 Second, it is possible to interpret the degree to which the financial sector is de-
veloped as a measure of something like broad macroeconomic efficiency. Thus financial 
development influences total factor productivity and the long-run growth rate.3 These 
two characterisations of the financial sector as a determinant of economic growth al-
ready reflect the competing approaches of the neoclassical and the endogenous growth 
theory. In neoclassical growth theory only increases in the level of macroeconomic effi-
ciency are responsible for a permanent growth of per capita income, which is attained 
by presuming an exogenous productivity growth rate. An increase, for example, of the 
saving rate induces a growth effect that is only transitory. Endogenous growth models, 
by contrast, permit also the possibility of a permanent increase in the growth rate of 
                                             
1 Influential theoretical contributions in the context of the new growth theory are ROMER (1986, 
1990), LUCAS (1988) and GROSSMAN/HELPMAN (1991). The empirical approaches of 
BARRO/SALA-I-MARTIN (1992) and MANKIW/ROMER/WEIL (1992) should also be mentioned in this 
context. For an overview see BARRO (1998).  
2  This view is based on the work of MCKINNON (1973) and SHAW (1973). One of the first analyses 
of the finance-growth nexus is GOLDSMITH (1996).  
3 See KING/LEVINE (1993 a, b); LEVINE (1998); RAJAN/ZINGALES (1998).  
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per capita income through an increase of the macroeconomic savings rate or through 
research and development activities. However, the endogenous growth approaches are 
not able to explain the convergence dynamics, that can be discovered empirically and 
constitute a special characterisation of neoclassical models. 
In the following we will not attempt a discriminating analysis of the connection 
between financial development and economic growth within neoclassical and endoge-
nous models.4 The purpose of this section is rather to discuss the different transmission 
channels, identified in both neoclassical and endogenous growth models. These charac-
teristics will also be implemented in a simple integrated growth-model in the next sec-
tion. In both neoclassical and endogenous models the long-run economic development 
of per-capita income is basically driven by two factors: the accumulation of input factors 
and the change in the macroeconomic efficiency in allocating  these input factors. The 
change in macroeconomic efficiency is often described as the growth of total factor 
productivity. 
 
Figure 1: Economic growth, financial development and financial integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Growth 
Factor Accumulation Macroeconomic Efficiency 
Physical Capital Human Capital  Innovation 
Information  Insurance Volume of Credit 
Financial Development  
Size  Efficiency Structure 
Financial Market Integration  
                                             
4 For an extensive summary of this discussion see LEVINE (1997).  
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The degree of financial development can be measured in terms of different 
components, namely the size, the structure and the efficiency of the financial sector.5 
This characterisation is shown in figure 1. Indicators that measure the size of the fi-
nancial sector basically include  information about the depth of financial intermedia-
tion. With the help of structural indicators we can obtain information about the allo-
cation of resources and the relevance of an economy's different financial institutions , 
e.g. the impact of private and state-owned banks. Using efficiency indicators the level 
of transaction cost, the degree of information asymmetries and in particular the com-
petition environment can be recorded. As figure 1 reveals, each of the different meas-
ures of the degree to which the financial sector is developed can be influenced by fi-
nancial market integration.  
Following figure 1, the financial sector affects both driving forces of growth, fac-
tor accumulation and efficiency of allocation. Literature has identified different 
channels making up the link between the financial sector and economic growth: 
 
• Supply of credits for investment  
 A developed, competitive financial sector ensures relatively small deviations 
between lending and deposit interest rates, which in turn enlarges that part of 
macroeconomic savings that can be transformed into credits for investment pro-
jects of the non-banking sector.6 According to the analysis of MCKINNON (1973) 
and SHAW (1973) a functioning financial sector ensures high private saving rates 
due to an attractive interest rate, high private savings facilitate investment ac-
tivities of private firms, and it enables an economy to grow at a high speed. This 
saving rate effect is intensified when the growth dynamics are also driven by 
human capital accumulation. Hence, the financial sector can raise the forma-
tion of human capital through the provision of credit to private households 
which use such financial means for private education investments.7 
 
• Provision of information  
 In economic theory the task of the financial sector should be, among other 
things, to channel savings into the most profitable investment projects. A devel-
oped financial sector facilitates this if banks and insurance companies monitor 
investment projects and provide information about potentially innovative en-
terprises to their customers.8 
                                             
5  See KING/LEVINE (1992) for this classification. 
6 See PAGANO (1993); BERTHÉLEMY/VAROUDAKIS (1996 a, b); ATJE/JOVANOVIC (1993); KING/LEVINE 
(1993 b) and BENCIVENGA/SMITH (1991). 
7 See DE GREGORIO (1996) and JAPPELLI/PAGANO (1994).  
8 See GREENWOOD/JOVANOVIC (1990); HOLMSTRÖM/TIROLE (1997). 
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• Insurance of risks 
 Since more profitable investment projects are usually associated with higher 
risks, improving the possibilities to insure oneself against these risks can signifi-
cantly increase investments financed by given savings.9 This insurance function 
is the more important the more economic growth is driven by technological in-
novations that are linked to high sunk costs.10 Through spillover-effects R&D 
drives the technological knowledge stock of an economy which in turn increases 
total factor productivity.  
 
To summarise, following economic theory the growth rate of a country is basi-
cally driven by factor accumulation and improvements in macroeconomic efficiency, 
i.e. growth of total factor productivity. A functioning financial sector is in part respon-
sible for the accumulation of input factors as well as for the efficiency with which the 
input factors can be used. The degree of the financial sector’s development can be 
measured in terms of its size, structure and efficiency. Each of these different financial 
measures can be influenced by financial market integration. Therefore, an increase in 
the degree of financial market integration that results in a rise in the financial sector’s 
development level enables a shift in the growth rate of per-capita income.  
 
2.2. Endogenous growth and financial intermediation 
Endogenous growth models opposed to traditional neoclassical approaches have the 
advantage that they enable us to give a convincing explanation of the direct influence 
the financial market has on an economy’s long-run growth rate. A major disadvantage 
of endogenous growth models is that they frequently imply parameter dependencies. 
This results in an immediate "jump" of economies on their equilibrium growth path 
which is incompatible with the empirical regularity of income convergence that takes a 
long time. In the model briefly outlined below the transmission channels of a function-
ing financial services sector can be merged to a theoretically consistent approach. Fur-
thermore, the model seems to be capable of analysing the impact of increasing finan-
cial market integration. The chosen approach is based on a production technology 
that allows to represent characteristics of both endogenous and neoclassical growth 
models. First, it includes the empirically observed phenomenon of convergence within 
specific groups of countries (conditional convergence), derivable from neoclassical 
models. Second, it implements main characteristics of endogenous growth models with 
a long-term positive growth rate that are independent of exogenous technological proc-
esses. Under the assumptions of the model it is shown that the convergence behaviour 
                                             
9 See OBSTFELD (1994). 
10 See SAINT-PAUL (1992). 
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as well as the equilibrium growth rate can be directly influenced by the development 
of the financial services sector market and  its deeper integration respectively.  
The underlying macroeconomic production function Y exhibits constant returns 
to scale and transitional declining marginal products of capital and labour in F(K,L): 
 
(2.1) . )L,K(FAKY +=
 
Y stands for macroeconomic output, K for capital stock and L for the labour force of 
the representative economy. A describes the level of technology or, in a more wider 
definition, macroeconomic efficiency.11 In per capita terms we can write (2.1) as: 
 
(2.2) , )k(fAky +=
 
with k standing for capital intensity K/L. 
Although we assume decreasing marginal products for the neoclassical part of 
the macroeconomic production function - f(k) in (2.2) - the endogenous part Ak guar-
antees a long-run constancy of the marginal product of capital so that a permanently 
positive growth rate is generated.12 
Capital intensity k evolves depending on investment activity I, population 
growth rate n and depreciation of the existing capital stock  according to: Kδ
 
(2.3) )n(
K
I
n
K
KI
n
K
K
kˆ:
k
k +δ−=−δ−=−== &&  . 
 
Following PAGANO (1993), the financial services sector determines which part of 
savings is  channelled into investment, i.e. into accumulation of the economy's capital 
stock.13 Only a fraction  of overall savings is available for investment activity:  λ
 
(2.4)  , with0 .  IsYS =λ=λ 1<λ<
                                             
11 This kind of production function is based on JONES/MANUELLI (1990). Time indices are sup-
pressed.  
12 Formally this follows from the violation of one of the INADA-conditions because here in the long-
run . 0>=∂∂∞→ Ak/ylim k
13 PAGANO (1993). 
 8 
 
The other fraction of savings  "vanishes" in the financial services sector. Accord-
ing to PAGANO (1993) the financial component in the growth model  can be described, 
for example, by the spread between lending and deposit interest rate. Therefore, a re-
duction in the interest rate spread, e.g. due to an increase in competition pressure, 
leads to a rising fraction of macroeconomic savings being channelled into investment. 
For the evolution of capital intensity this means:  
)1( λ−
 
(2.5) )n(
k
)k(f
As)n(
K
sY
kˆ +δ−

 +λ=+δ−λ= . 
 
The Modification of (2.5) results in a fundamental equation of the evolution of the 
capital intensity: 
 
(2.6) [ ]
32144 344 21
econvergenc
of component
component
term-long
 
k
)k(f
s)n(sAkˆ λ+δ+−λ=  . 
 
By means of equation (2.6) a positive dependence of the growth rate on capital 
intensity can be identified when looking at  both the long-term component and the 
convergence component. The influence of the convergence component decreases in 
time with increasing capital accumulation due to the decrease in the marginal product 
of capital. Countries that are already at an advanced stage of development show 
smaller growth rates than countries whose capital intensity falls relatively far below 
their equilibrium value.14 In the long-run (i.e. ) k  approaches a permanently 
positive and exogenous value which is determined by the difference between  
and ( . Hence, as a condition for a positive growth rate in the long-run the validity 
of λ  must be guaranteed. 
∞→k ˆ
sAλ
)n+δ
(sA δ> )n+
In the steady state all considered variables grow at the same rate. Accordingly, 
the dependence on a convergence component  and a long-run component  
is also valid for the growth rate of per-capita income: 
)(yˆ t λ )(*yˆ λ
 
                                             
14 In the context of the convergence discussion it is clear that this means conditional convergence. 
As a consequence the considered countries that show income convergence exhibit similar char-
acteristics of the other relevant growth determinants. 
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(2.7) [ ]
32144 344 21
)(yˆ  econvergenc
of component)(*yˆcomponent 
run-long
t
k
)k(f
s)n(sAyˆ
λ
λ
λ+δ+−λ=  . 
 
To summarise, in this section we identified long-term and transitional links be-
tween financial markets and economic growth from a macroeconomic perspective in a 
very simple approach.  Using an integrated growth model that highlights both neoclas-
sical and endogenous growth characteristics therefore constitutes an extension of the 
analysis of PAGANO (1993). This is an important aspect because, based on the conver-
gence component, the entire macroeconomic effect that is generated by a shift in the 
degree of the financial services sector’s  development results in a greater total growth 
bonus. 
 
2.3. Growth bonus of financial market integration  
The theoretical formula in section 2.2. demonstrates that financial markets influence 
both the long-term component of the evolution of per-capita income and the transi-
tional component. The level of  is determined crucially by the level of development 
of the financial services sector, which in turn can be influenced by a variation in its 
size, structure and efficiency. These different measures of the stage of development can 
be significantly altered by financial market integration. Despite the fundamental im-
plications of the finance-growth nexus, the theoretical model is only of limited use for 
examinations concerning the impact of financial integration. A shift in parameter  
following enhanced financial market integration causes a rise in the equilibrium 
growth rate due to a higher growth rate of total factor productivity. This effect is simi-
lar to the efficiency function of the financial sector described above. Moreover, a 
catching-up process can be identified that results in a higher transitional growth rate 
on the way to a new steady state. This second effect is induced by the accumulation 
function of the financial sector which stimulates investment into the macroeconomic 
capital stock. However, the extent of this catching-up effect depends on the stage of 
economic development a country is experiencing at the respective moment. This 
means that only a conditional convergence effect can be generated.  
λ
λ
Figure 2 represents this way of formulating the “financial integration growth 
nexus” graphically. Obviously, a shift in the degree of the financial sector’s develop-
ment resulting in an increase in the part of savings that are transformed into invest-
ment ( ) leads to a higher growth rate. The shift in development can be meas-
ured in terms of an increase in the financial sector’s size or efficiency or, a change in 
its structure. Here the shift in financial development and the higher growth rate can 
be attributed to financial market integration. Hence, financial market integration in-
duces a short-run acceleration of the growth rate of per capita income. Furthermore, 
01 λ>λ
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the long-term growth rate can be raised as well. The first effect can be called the "short-
run growth bonus", the second one the "long-run growth bonus" of financial market in-
tegration.  
 
Figure 2: Long-run growth and convergence bonus of financial integration 
  yˆ
    (yˆ t 0λ )(yˆ t 1λ)
)
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          (*yˆ 1λ
 
 
          (*yˆ 0λ
 
         k 
 
To summarise, financial market integration enhances an economy’s growth pos-
sibilities through the following channels: 
 
• Foreign banks and insurance companies improve the quality and availability of 
financial services in the domestic financial market by increasing competition.  
• An increase in foreign bank penetration leads to lower profitability and over-
head expenses (personal and other non-interest expenses) for banks, and this 
enhances economic growth by promoting domestic banking efficiency. 
• Enhanced competition in connection with external economies of scale forces 
domestic institutions to apply more modern human skills and technology. 
• The presence of foreign financial companies stimulates the development of the 
underlying legal framework, for example, banking supervision. 
• Financial integration enhances a country's access to international capital.  
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The macroeconomic (static and dynamic) welfare gains over-compensate the de-
crease in banking profitability.15 By way of example we could assume that a shift in 
the number of foreign retail banks will result in an increased competition in the do-
mestic market for retail banking products and for this reason in a reduction of the 
spread between lending and deposit rate, which would improve investment possibili-
ties for private and non-private firms as well as for private households. Consequently, 
in the context of the simple growth model developed above a promotion of the growth 
rate can be expected.  
 
3. Financial Market Integration in Europe 
This section outlines the extent to which the European markets for financial service 
products are currently integrated. In particular we are interested in the foreign activi-
ties of banking and insurance companies. It is worth mentioning that our analysis is 
not aimed at drawing a complete picture of all the competing definitions, determi-
nants and political implications of the different indicators that measure financial in-
tegration.16 We therefore concentrate on macroeconomic variables available over a rela-
tively long time span which we use in our econometric estimations in the following 
section.  
Historical evidence shows that several political attempts were made in the past 
to enhance the extent of European financial integration. Substantial obstacles to cross-
border activities remain, however, resulting in potential growth and employment 
losses. In general, we can make a distinction between natural obstacles and policy-
induced obstacles impeding cross-border activities. Natural obstacles are, for example, 
consumer preferences and  cultural or language differences. In particular they are not 
changeable in the short-run by policy makers. However, policy-induced obstacles, 
which include taxes, national regulations and standards can be removed by policy 
makers. Since we are interested in the macroeconomic effects of financial market inte-
gration we do not analyse different obstacles that result in a fragmentation of the 
European financial markets in detail.17 Rather, we point to some aspects of policy-
induced obstacles as well as attempts to their removal. The main obstacles identified 
by the LAMFALUSSY report consist of the legal framework for cross-border activities and 
the degree to which existing European laws are implemented in the EU member 
                                             
15  See CLAESSENS ET AL. (1998), DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL. (1998) and Levine (1998). For an empirical 
assessment of the impact of foreign bank entry on the profitability in the banking sector and its 
welfare implications see CLAESSENS ET AL. (1997).  
16  For a comprehensive overview see e.g. BUCH (2000); LEMMEN (1998) and DANTHINE ET AL. (1999, 
2000).  
17  For an extensive analysis see EPPENDORFER AT AL. (2002) for the banking sector and BECKMANN 
ET AL. (2002) for the insurance sector.  
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states.18 Nevertheless, the Financial Services Action Plan, adopted by the European 
Commission, is an actual example that policy makers are aware of these problems and 
willing to tackle them.  
 
3.1. The legal framework in a historical perspective  
Figure 3 summarises the milestones of deregulation in the banking products sector.  
 
Figure 3: Time line of EU financial services integration in banking markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU (2001a,b) 
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Policy-induced integration started in 1973 with directive 73/183aiming at in-
troducing the right of establishment and freedom to provide services for all financial 
professions. Other major steps towards an integrated market for banking products were 
incorporated in the banking directive of 1977 which included procedures for the co-
ordination of national laws, administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions. The main element of the second banking 
directive 1989 was the introduction of a single banking licence allowing a branch of 
an institution authorised in another member state to be opened without authorisation 
from the host member state and without the need for separate endowment capital. 
This directive introduced the principle of "home-country control" for the first time in 
cross-border banking business. Later directives included the adoption of common sol-
                                             
18  See LAMFALUSSY Report (2001). 
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vency standards (1989) and the harmonisation of essential rules for supervising large 
exposures of credit institutions (1992). Minimum requirements needed to ensure an 
adequate level of customer information both before and after the execution of a cross-
border credit transfer were implemented in 1997. One of the last major steps in spur-
ring integration can be seen in the introduction of a technology-neutral legal frame-
work in 2000 aiming at the implementation and the harmonisation of prudential su-
pervision of electronic money institutions. It is expected that the New Basel Accord on 
banking supervision will be implemented in 2004. 
Although deregulation steps were numerous they were often time-consuming. 
Figure 4 shows the time profile required for a directive to become community law with 
"period of implementation" standing for the period between the date of publication 
and the date of entry into force. 
 
Figure 4: Time profile required for a directive to become community law (banking)  
 1970... 1980... 1990... 2000... 
Freedom of establishment       
First Banking Directive           
Basel Capital Accord                        
Second Banking Directive                         
Cross-border credit transfers                               
Third stage of EMU                                
New Basel Accord                                    
 
       Period of implementation 
       Community law 
Source: EU (2001a,b) 
 
In the insurance products sector integration started at the beginning of the 
1970s as well. The time line of major integration steps is shown in figure 5. Directive 
(72/166) in 1972 was aimed at the abolition of frontier controls of compulsory insur-
ance for motor vehicles. The first non-life insurance directive of 1973 established an 
appropriate legal framework for exercising freedom of establishment in the Commu-
nity in respect of non-life insurance. With the third non-life insurance directive in 
1992 a single authorisation system was introduced. This implies that any insurance 
undertaking, whose head office is in one of the Community member states can estab-
lish branches in another member state and carry on business by way of providing 
cross-border services under the supervision of the member state where its head office is 
located. Hence, the principle of "home country control" was also established in the 
market for non-life insurance products. In the market for life insurance products ma-
jor integration steps were implemented through the second life insurance directive 
which laid down two sets of arrangements with regard to the freedom to provide ser-
vices: application of the principle of home country control, which covers those policy-
holders not requiring specific protection due to the application of the rules of their 
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member states of residence; application of the rules of, and supervision by, the mem-
ber state in which the service is supplied (risk country control), this covers other policy-
holders requiring such specific protection. The major objective of the third life-
insurance directive was to complete the internal market in this form of insurance ac-
tivity on the basis of the principles of a single administrative licence and supervision 
of the insurance undertaking's activities by the authorities in the member state in 
which that undertaking has its head office. 
 
Figure 5: Time line of EU financial services directives in insurance markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EU (2001a,b) 
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Figure 6 shows the time profile required for a insurance directive to become 
Community law is shown. As figure 6 reveals, some directives took considerable time to 
become effective community law as can also be observed with the banking directives.  
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Figure 6: Time profile required for a directive to become community law (insurance) 
 1970... 1980... 1990... 2000... 
First motor insurance 
Directive 
    
First non-life insurance 
Directive 
       
First life assurance Direc-
tive 
           
Second motor insurance 
Directive 
                  
Second non-life insurance 
Directive 
                     
Second life assurance 
Directive 
                       
Third life assurance Direc-
tive 
                        
Third non-life insurance 
Directive 
                        
 
     Period of implementation  
         Community law 
Source: EU (2001a,b) 
 
 To summarise, the figures 3-6 show that in the past 30 years considerable at-
tempts were made to enhance the degree of integration in the markets for financial 
service products. For instance, a significant degree of harmonisation has been 
achieved with the establishment of the banking and insurance directives. Furthermore, 
substantial obstacles  impeding cross-border financial activities due to national regula-
tions have been reduced. Nevertheless, this process moves forward very slowly as the 
figures for implementation periods reveal. Moreover, it can be suspected that substan-
tial obstacles to financial services still remain, for instance in the field of international 
accounting standards, financial conglomerates, and cross-country mergers and acquisi-
tions.  
 
3.2. How integrated are European financial markets  
actually? 
In the previous section we outlined selective advances in establishing a sufficient legal 
framework to promote cross-border activities in the European financial services sector. 
Nevertheless we suspected that significant obstacles remain. Consequently, the follow-
ing analysis tries to give an assessment of the extent to which the European financial 
markets are actually integrated. It is worth mentioning that macroeconomic data on 
cross-border activities of banking and insurance institutions are difficult to obtain. As 
we tried to use data that are available for a significant number of EU member states 
while capturing a relatively long time span, the analysis had to focus on foreign direct 
investment. Unfortunately, we thus had to neglect possible variables associated with 
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"direct" cross-border business. However, as many banking and insurance institutions 
have become international since the implementation of the first directives in the rele-
vant markets, this restriction does not change the results fundamentally. The following 
descriptive analysis shows to which degree banks and insurance companies have ex-
panded abroad by establishing foreign subsidiaries and branches, or through mergers 
with and acquisitions of established foreign institutions, although we do not discrimi-
nate between these different strategies.  
As a direct measure of integration in the European sector for banking products 
we display the Foreign Bank Share of selected European countries in terms of numbers 
(figure 7) and foreign bank assets in total banking sector assets (figure 8).19 Both indi-
cators of foreign banking penetration have been obtained from the database the 
WORLD BANK has been published in 2001 as part of their "finance for growth" project.20  
 
Figure 7: Foreign Bank Share (Ratio of domestic banks owned by foreigners) 
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Source: Own calculations, data obtained from WORLD BANK (2001) 
 
 Figure 7 shows substantial differences in the number of the foreign bank pene-
tration measure. The banking sector of the United Kingdom, for instance, is character-
ised by a large number of foreign owned banks, whereas this banking integration indi-
                                             
19  Due to missing data points Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden have been ignored. See 
EPPENDORFER ET AL. (2002) for a further analysis of foreign market penetration strategies in the 
banking industry.  
20  See BECK ET AL. (1999). According to the definition of the WORLD BANK (2001) and OECD 
(2000) a bank is called "foreign" if at least 50% of its equity is owned by foreigners. 
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cator is nearly zero percent in Italy’s banking market.21 This picture is confirmed in 
figure 8, with the volatility of this foreign penetration measure being even more pro-
nounced. 
 
Figure 8: Foreign Bank Share (ratio of domestic bank assets owned by foreigners) 
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 A comparison of figure 7 with figure 8 reveals that on average  the foreign 
banks penetration indicator in pure numbers exceeds the indicator in terms of assets 
for most countries. This might reflect the empirical regularity that foreign banks tend 
to be smaller than domestic banks. Both measures of foreign penetration have not 
changed very much since the beginning of the 1990s, although we can even observe a 
fall in the ratio of foreign bank assets in total assets for some countries, e.g. the Neth-
erlands.  
 Complementary to the time profile of the foreign bank share, another banking 
integration indicator is shown in figure 9, which provides information about the at-
tractiveness of a country for foreign investors in the banking sector. It is also calcu-
lated from WORLD BANK (2001) data and is based on a survey that was sent to national 
bank regulatory and supervisory authorities in 1998.22  
Figure 9 shows that there are substantial differences between the European 
countries concerning the ratio of foreign applications for banking licenses in percent 
                                             
21  The highest foreign bank share in numbers is ascertained for Ireland in 1997, with 65% of all 
banks belonging to foreign owners (not shown).  
22  See BARTH, J. R. ET AL. (2001a,b). 
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to all banking applications in the domestic country. Nevertheless, the conclusion that 
countries with a low value of this integration indicator experience a low degree of for-
eign competition is misleading. On the one hand, 12 applications of foreign banks 
have been registered, for instance, in the Netherlands in 1998. But in the same year 
domestic institutes filed 30 applications for banking licenses. On the other hand, 
countries with a ratio of 100% of foreign applications like Belgium registered 24 for-
eign, but no domestic applications. 
 
Figure 9: Ratio of foreign applications for banking licenses 1998  
(in percent of total domestic applications)  
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 The databases for a description of the integration progress in the insurance 
products sector are even more limited than for the banking sector. The WORLD BANK 
(2001) database on finance and growth does not include insurance indicators compa-
rable to the banking measures above. The most suitable database for our purposes is 
the Insurance Statistics Yearbook, published by the OECD.23 But even this database 
raises serious problems, because due to the third insurance directive the composition 
of some indicators was changed in 1994.24 Figure 10 shows the Foreign Insurance Share 
                                             
23  See BECKMANN ET AL. (2002) for a further analysis.  
24  In consequence, we have to correct the formerly MK1 indicator, which includes foreign con-
trolled companies as well as branches and agencies of foreign companies. Therefore, we simply 
calculate the difference between MK1 and MK2. The latter measures the market share of for-
eign branches and agencies, so that the resulting indicator includes solely the market share of 
foreign controlled companies. We do not control for the fact, that the OECD market share of 
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(Life) for the countries and the time span it is available for. This financial integration 
indicator represents a measure of foreign market penetration in the sector for life in-
surance products on a gross premium basis.  
Figure 10 shows that, comparable to banking markets, substantial differences 
in the extent to which the European insurance markets are integrated can be observed 
in the sector for life insurance products. The picture of the time profile is also am-
biguous. Austria, for instance, exhibits a relatively constant foreign life-insurance 
share, whereas this integration indicator is quite volatile in Spain. Hence, one cannot 
conclude from figure 10 that any substantial integration advances were made in the 
European insurance markets over the last years. 
 
Figure 10: Foreign Insurance Share (Life) 1992 - 1999 (market share of foreign con-
trolled companies on premium basis in percent) 
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In addition, figure 11 shows the Foreign Insurance Share (Non-Life) which repre-
sents a measure of foreign market penetration in the sector for non-life insurance 
products also on a gross premium basis.  
                                                                                                                                           
foreign controlled companies includes countries  that are not part of the EU. Apart form this, 
non-EU countries play a minor role in EU insurance business. 
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Figure 11: Foreign Insurance Share (Non-Life) 1992 - 1999 (market share of foreign 
controlled companies on premium basis in percent) 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
AUS
DEN
GER
NET
POR
SPA
UK
Source: Own calculations, data source is OECD, Insurance Statistics Yearbook 
 
Obviously, the foreign market share is higher in the sector for non-life insurance 
products than in the life-insurance markets. Perhaps this can be attributed to a lower 
degree of consumer sensitivity in this product category. Anyhow, the cross-country dif-
ferences in the foreign market penetration in the sector for non-life insurance products 
are as distinctive as in life-insurance markets. 
 With regard to the varying foreign penetration shares we can summarise that 
the picture of integration in the European markets for financial services which can be 
drawn from indicators in the banking and insurance sectors is not very precise. Sub-
stantial differences can be observed for different countries and different integration 
indicators. Some countries like Austria show a substantially integrated insurance mar-
ket, whereas the Austrian banking market can be considered as being almost closed. In 
contrast, Germany, which exhibits a relatively high ratio of foreign applications for 
banking licences in 1998, can be regarded as a relatively closed economy concerning 
its foreign insurance penetration ratio. Hence, despite substantial qualifications re-
garding the significance of the underlying data and the restriction to foreign penetra-
tion measures - which, for example, does not reflect the  increasing relevance of e-
banking or capture integration in the investment funds business - we can conclude 
that the extent to which financial markets in Europe are integrated is far away from 
reflecting a "Single Market for Financial Services".  
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3.3. The Financial Services Action Plan 
The illustration of the development of the market share of foreign controlled compa-
nies has revealed substantial differences in the extent to which European economies 
are integrated. Furthermore, it was found that some countries may even be character-
ised as "closed economies" concerning their financial markets. Nevertheless, the poten-
tial loss of possible growth and employment benefits of a lagging European integration 
in the market for financial service products was widely recognised by the European 
authorities. The Final Report on the Regulation of European Securities Markets from 
the Committee of Wise Men chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy is an essential contribu-
tion to necessary reforms of the regulatory framework for European financial markets. 
The LAMFALUSSY report (2001) identifies the legal framework for cross-border activities 
and the degree of implementation of existing European laws as main obstacles.25 A 
series of policy objectives and specific measures to improve the framework for a func-
tioning single market for financial services was outlined in the Financial Services Ac-
tion Plan ratified by the European Council of Ministers in 1999 and adopted by the 
European Commission. In the following, selective elements of this important instru-
ment to remove remaining policy induced obstacles to cross-border financial activities 
are briefly discussed.  
In particular the Financial Services Action Plan suggests priorities and time-
scales for legislative and other measures. Its primary aims lie in five imperatives: en-
dowment of the EU with a legislative apparatus capable of responding to new regula-
tory challenges; elimination of any remaining capital market fragmentation; improve-
ment of the possibilities for users and suppliers of financial services to exploit the op-
portunities offered by a single market, while simultaneously ensuring consumer protec-
tion; encouragement of a closer co-ordination of supervisory institutions; development 
of a European infrastructure to reduce the costs of retail and wholesale financial 
transactions.26  
The Financial Services Action Plan consists mainly of three strategic objectives: 
ensuring a single market for wholesale financial services, open and secure retail mar-
kets and state-of-the-art prudential rules and supervision. The contents of these strate-
gies are summarised in the table 1.  
 
                                             
25  The Committee was set up in a joint initiative of the French Presidency and the European 
Commission. For the full text see LAMFALUSSY Report (2001).  
26  See EUROPEAN COMMISSION (1999)  
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Table 1: Strategic objectives of the Financial Services Action Plan 
Single EU wholesale market - Single passport for recognised stock markets 
 - Modernisation of admission to listing 
 - Single prospectus for issuers 
 - Adoption of international accounting standards 
 - Adopting a Directive on Cross-border Use of Collaterals 
 - Home country control for all wholesale markets  
- Definition of professional investors 
 - Issuing a Commission Communication on Upgrading the Investment 
  Services Directive  
 - Issuing a Commission Communication on the Application of Con- 
  duct of Business Rules Under Art. 11 of the ISD 
 - Modernisation of investment rules for supplementary pension funds 
 - Adopting the Directive on the Prudential Supervision of Supplemen- 
  tary Pension Funds 
 - Adopting the two Directives on UCITS 
 - Adopting the proposed Directive on Take Over Bids 
 - Adopting the European Company Statute 
Open, secure retail markets - Issuing a Commission Communication on E-commerce Policy for 
  Financial Services 
 - Adopting the Directive on Distance Marketing of Financial Services 
Sound prudential rules - Creation of a Securities Committee  
 - Adopting a Directive on Prudential Rules for Financial Conglomer- 
  ates 
 - Adopting a Directive Governing the Capital Framework for Banks 
  and Investment Firms 
 - Adopting a Directive on Market Manipulation 
 - Adopting the Directive on the Reorganisation and Winding-up of 
  Insurance Undertakings 
 - Adopting the Directive on the Winding-up and Liquidation of Banks 
 - Adopting the Amendments to the Money Laundering Directive 
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2000, 2001), own presentation 
 
By establishing the Financial Services Action Plan the European Commission 
and the Council of Ministers have created a valuable instrument to demonstrate a fur-
ther removal of cross-border barriers to European banking and insurance institutions  
by identifying main obstacles to the integration of financial markets and making seri-
ous suggestions as to how to overcome them. Hence, the Financial Services Action Plan 
can bee seen as a significant step towards faster and deeper European financial inte-
gration. Nevertheless, financial companies should be aware of time lags when imple-
menting the strategic objectives into Community law. The analysis of previous banking 
and insurance directives in the last section has shown that these time lags might be 
considerable. Furthermore, some major policy induced obstacles to cross-border finan-
cial activities are not included in the Financial Services Action Plan to a sufficient 
extent. For instance, the rising relevance of private pension funds in Europe requires a 
functioning legal framework that goes beyond the attempts shown in table 1. There 
might be other serious problems such as differing  principles of national supervisory 
authorities, accounting standards, European company law, consumer protection and 
personal bankruptcy law. We will not analyse these remaining obstacles and their de-
terminants in detail. However, in the next section we will attempt to assess from a 
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macroeconomic perspective to which extent the removal of cross-border barriers result-
ing in an increased foreign market penetration in banking and insurance markets af-
fects growth paths and labour markets of the European economies.  
 
4. Empirical Evaluation  
In section 2 we have shown in a simple endogenous growth model that financial de-
velopment and financial integration undoubtedly enhances economic growth. Ad-
vances in deregulating the European financial services sectors were outlined in a his-
torical perspective, supplemented with empirical evidence for the degree of effective 
integration in the banking and insurance markets in the last section. We then argued 
that the reduction of the remaining substantial obstacles to a functioning single mar-
ket for financial services was extensively addressed in the Financial Services Action 
Plan of the European Commission. In this chapter the theoretical perceptions will be 
combined with the empirical evidence. We will attempt to give an assessment of the 
potential welfare gains in terms of a rise in growth rates and a reduction of unem-
ployment rates the European economics will potentially experience when they imple-
ment an improved climate for cross-border activities in the financial sector.  
 
4.1. Definition of variables and estimation approach  
The analysis of the EU member states is based on a three-step approach to quantify 
growth and employment benefits of financial integration. In a first step we try to con-
trol for the growth effects of financial development. To this end, we estimate a growth 
equation with typical "growth determinants" and different indicators of financial mar-
ket development on the right hand side.27 We employ a panel-data approach for the 
time series/cross-country data of the EU member states, with the exception of Luxem-
bourg, for the years 1960 to 1999. A fixed and random effect technique is utilised to 
permit differences in the country-specific regression constants. Under the neoclassical 
growth theory these constants represent the rate of total factor productivity growth and 
include institutional characteristics. In the context of this paper we argue that these 
country characteristics capture the extent to which financial markets are integrated as 
well as obstacles to financial integration due to national regulations.28 
                                             
27  In the first step we regress the growth rate on different indicators of financial market develop-
ment for two reasons. First, it is necessary to control for monetary variables other than financial 
market integration. Second, in our approach we need to "produce" country-specific constants, 
which will be applied in the second estimation step. See OLSON ET AL. (2000) for an equivalent 
approach. 
28  It is important to mention that we do not try to examine the growth model of chapter 2 literally. 
Although the main elements are implemented, we do not estimate the structural equation re-
sulting from the theoretical analysis. 
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We refer to the growth of real per capita GDP and the unemployment rate re-
spectively as welfare indicators. The indicators we use are primarily obtained from 
WORLD BANK databases, namely from the World Development Indicators and from a 
new database, forming the basis of the WORLD BANK project Finance for Growth, which 
comprises a considerable amount of valuable financial indicators. In the data pool all 
economies of the European Union except Luxembourg are included.  
In the first step we follow a conventional econometric approach in which we de-
fine the yearly growth rate of real GDP per capita (GRWTH) as the dependent variable 
and test the explanatory power of some indicators of financial development. GDP per 
capita is based on purchasing power parities.  The share of gross domestic investment 
in GDP (INVEST) is used as (traditional) control variable. Furthermore, the rate of 
population growth (POP) is included as an additional control variable.  
In the first step the variable of interest is financial market development in 
terms of growth effects.29 To control for the different transmission channels, the extent 
to which the financial market is developed is divided into the three sub-categories size, 
structure and efficiency. As defined above, size indicators include mainly information 
about the depth of financial intermediation. By applying structural indicators it is 
possible to obtain information about the allocation of resources and the relevance of 
different financial institutions of a country, e.g. the impact of private and state-owned 
banks. Efficiency indicators are used to record the level of transaction cost, the degree 
of information asymmetries and especially the competition environment. Every cate-
gory of financial development is measured separately for the banking and insurance 
sector by applying one of the suitable indicators listed in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Indicators of Financial Development 
Indicator Banking Sector  Insurance Sector  
Size BANKS LIP 
Structure CREDIT LIS 
Efficiency CONCEN PREMIUM 
 
The size of the banking sector is typically measured with the indicator Deposit 
Money Bank Assets to GDP (BANKS). The assets of deposit money banks include claims 
on the entire non-financial real sector relative to GDP. The size of the insurance sector 
                                             
29  In the literature on finance and growth there is an extensive discussion whether the financial 
market development influences the real sector, i.e. the growth rate, or the other way around (see 
LEVINE, 1997). Even for the analysis here the direction of causality is not clear. The evidence of 
various tests for Granger causality with different indicators of financial development is not very 
clear-cut.  
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can be measured with the indicator Life Insurance Penetration (LIP) which includes the 
volume of direct premiums of commercially active insurers written in the domestic life 
insurance sector relative to GDP. There is no distinction between the companies in 
state or private ownership and between management by domestic or foreign insurers. 
LIP represents the relative importance of the insurance industry in the domestic econ-
omy.30 
The structure of the banking sector is measured with Private Credit by Deposit 
Money Banks to all Domestic Credit (CREDIT) and, for the insurance sector, with the 
Life Insurance Share (LIS) indicator. CREDIT includes the ratio of claims on the pri-
vate sector by deposit money banks opposed to all domestic credits which include also 
credits issued to governments and public enterprises.31 LIS is defined as the ratio of 
gross life insurance premiums to total gross premiums of an economy. Hence, LIS re-
veals information about the relative importance of life insurance as compared to non-
life insurance.32 
Finally, efficiency in the financial sector is measured with the indicators Con-
centration in the Banking Sector (CONCEN) and Direct Total Gross Premiums per Em-
ployees in the Insurance Sector (PREMIUM).33 The banking indicator reveals informa-
tion about the competition environment in the banking market as it is defined as the 
ratio of the three largest banks’ assets to total banking sector assets. The insurance 
indicator PREMIUM measures the relative efficiency of a national insurance industry. 
It is calculated by dividing the direct gross premiums by the number of employees in 
insurance companies. PREMIUM can be interpreted as a measure of efficiency as well 
as an indicator of competition in the insurance products sector. 
After the estimation of the growth impact of financial market development, we 
can extract the country-specific regression constants to use them, in the second step, as 
dependent variable. To estimate the extent to which European financial integration 
has influenced total factor productivity growth we utilise a simple cross-country regres-
sion approach in this second step. Here we estimate, analogously to the first step, a 
number of equations with different financial integration indicators and control vari-
ables on the right-hand side. The integration of the banking products market is meas-
ured with Foreign Bank Share on the pure number and in terms of assets illustrated in 
chapter 3. The integration of the insurance products market is measured with Foreign 
Insurance Share for life and non-life business, both on the premium basis. Based on 
                                             
30  Both indicators are taken from WORLD BANK (2001).  
31  CREDIT is obtained from IMF (2000), International Financial Statistics, series 32d/(series 
32a,..,f). 
32  LIS is obtained from various issues of the OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook.  
33  CONCEN is taken from WORLD BANK (2001). PREMIUM is obtained from various issues of the 
OECD Insurance Statistics Yearbook. 
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the regression results of the second step we are able to calculate the growth bonus that 
deeper European financial integration will generate analogously to the CECCHINI Re-
port.  
In a third step the analysis of the macroeconomic growth effects is supple-
mented with an analysis of the link between financial integration and employment. To 
asses the potential benefits of fostered financial integration we estimate country-
specific OKUN coefficients, which provide information about the growth rate a country 
needs to reduce unemployment.  
 
4.2. Estimation results 
4.2.1. Growth bonus of financial market integration 
The results of ADF-Tests reveal that all financial development time series exhibit the 
property of one unit root, we thus use the growth rate of BANKS, CREDIT and 
CONCEN, and the growth rate of LIP, LIS and PREMIUM, respectively. Table 3 shows 
the estimation results for the different financial indicators and the two control vari-
ables .34  
With regard to the traditional variables, only the share of investment in GDP is 
identified as a significant "determinant of economic growth". In all six regressions the 
coefficient of INVEST shows the expected sign at a high level of significance. The sign 
of the coefficient for population growth differs from the theoretical prediction in re-
gression 1 and 2, albeit only insignificantly. In all the other regressions POP is signifi-
cant and shows the expected negative sign. 
There is no clear-cut empirical evidence for the financial indicators . In particu-
lar, the coefficient for the BANKS indicator and the penetration variable for insurance 
products (LIP) show an unexpected significant negative sign. CONCEN shows the ex-
pected negative sign but this is insignificant even at the 10% level. All the other finan-
cial variables are highly significant and show the expected sign. Therefore, a high 
growth of credits granted to the private sector relative to the growth of all domestic 
credit (CREDIT) generates a high growth rate of real GDP per capita. This result is 
also true for the growth of the ratio of life insurance premiums (LIS) and the growth of 
premiums per employee in the insurance sector (PREMIUM).  
 
                                             
34  POP and INVEST are considered as usual in natural logarithms . We compute WHITE het-
eroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance and use cross section weights, i.e. cross 
section heteroskedasticity is also controlled for by using a GLS estimation technique. 
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Table 3: Estimation results financial development and growth 
 Reg1 Reg2 Reg3 Reg4 Reg5 Reg6 
INVEST 0.06604*** 
(9.70) 
0.05677*** 
(7.97) 
0.05691*** 
(2.96) 
0.05950*** 
(4.49) 
0.11713*** 
(4.88) 
0.09845** 
(2.33) 
POP 0.00029 
(0.24) 
0.00096 
(0.79) 
-0.00922*** 
(-5.82) 
-0.00455** 
(-2.50) 
-0.01290*** 
(-6.21) 
-0.01298*** 
(-6.04) 
 
Banking 
      
BANKS -0.03948*** 
(-2.92) 
     
CREDIT  0.08631*** 
(3.99) 
    
CONCEN   -0.00032 
(-0.05) 
   
 
Insurance 
      
LIP    -0.01753* 
(-1.86) 
  
LIS     0.03020** 
(2.51) 
 
PREMIUM      0.02374** 
(2.21) 
F-statstic 89.17*** 87.69*** 26.44*** 23.30*** 35.69*** 25.20*** 
2R  0.26 0.26 0.28 0.21 0.40 0.38 
Sample 1961 - 1997 1961 - 1997 1991 - 1997 1988 - 1996 1992 - 1997 1992 -1997 
Obs. 463 455 94 118 83 62 
Note: Growth of real GDP per capita (GRWTH) is the dependent variable in all regressions . 
t-statistics are displayed below the coefficients in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% confidence level is indicated with *,**, and ***.  
 
The estimation results of table 3 reveal a weak verification for theoretical ap-
proaches, which confirms that the structure of the financial sector is meaningful for 
the development in the real sector. The pure size of the financial sector can not be 
called a "determinant of economic growth", here the indicators BANKS and LIP are 
even negative. For the efficiency of the financial sector a positive connection between 
both the insurance and banking indicator and the overall growth rate can be identi-
fied. In the banking sector an increase in competition (a reduction of CONCEN) corre-
sponds to an increase in the growth rate of GDP per capita, albeit only insignificantly. 
An increase in PREMIUM corresponds to an increase in the GDP growth rate, a result 
that is counterintuitive when a rise in the premiums per employee in the insurance 
sector is interpreted as an indication of reduced competition in the insurance sector.35 
In contrast, the growth of the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector proportional 
to all domestic credits (CREDIT), which measures the structure of the financial sector, 
is connected with a positive growth rate. This positive influence of the financial struc-
ture , also holds true for the growth of the life insurance share (LIS).  
                                             
35  Due to data limitations UK is dropped from Reg6.  
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However, the estimation results in table 3 should not be read without consider-
able reservations. First, in Reg1 the coefficient of BANKS does not show the correct 
sign. Second, the regressions for the insurance indicators (Reg4, Reg5 and Reg6) cover 
only a very short time period due to data limitations. This restriction is also valid for 
Reg3 using the concentration indicator in the banking sector as explanatory variable. 
Ultimately, only the second regression (Reg2) provides enough observations over a rela-
tively long time span, a correct and significant sign of the financial indicator as well as 
an acceptable explanatory power to mirror the connection between financial develop-
ment and economic growth.36 Hence, we will use the result of this growth equation for 
the further analysis of the impact of financial integration. 
But before we start with the empirical evaluation of the potential growth effects 
of a deeper European financial integration, we re-estimate Reg2 with an alternative 
assumption for the country-specific effects to ensure our panel data results. The as-
sumption that the country-specific effects are fixed has some intuitive appeal because 
it implies that these effects are correlated with the other explanatory variables. How-
ever, the use of fixed effects become inappropriate when this assumption actually does 
not hold true. Particularly under these conditions the fixed-effect estimator is no 
longer efficient and a random coefficient model should be applied. We use the 
DURBIN-WU-HAUSMAN-test to decide which alternative should be used.37 The test is 
based on the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the random effects 
and the fixed effects estimator. Here the value of the test-statistic is -4.23. Compared 
with the critical value of the relevant chi-squared table with three degrees of freedom 
(7.81), it is clear that the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the two 
estimators can not be revised at a significance level of 5%. Therefore, we use the speci-
fication of Reg2 with country-specific random effects, which we define as dependent 
variable in the following analysis. According to neoclassical growth theory these coun-
try-specific effects measure the different growth rates of total factor productivity, which 
drives the income path of a country in the long-run. The country-specific effects are 
influenced by institutional infrastructure and other country characteristics, one of 
them being the degree of financial integration.  
Since the country specific effects of the first regression are defined as the de-
pendent variable in the second step, a simple cross-section OLS-approach for the pe-
riod 1990-97 is applied, which is the longest time span for which the relevant financial 
data is available. The indicators that measure the extent to which financial markets 
are integrated correspond to the descriptive view of section 3. Table 4 shows the esti-
                                             
36  It is worth mentioning that the magnitude of CREDIT seems quite high: an increase in the 
growth rate of CREDIT of one percentage point would increase the growth rate of real per cap-
ita GDP by 8.6 percentage points. Nevertheless, this seems reasonable because the annual 
growth rate of the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector proportional to all domestic 
credit  amounts on average to 0.04% for the European economies .  
37  See GREENE (2000), pp 576.  
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mation results for different financial integration indicators, namely the Foreign Bank 
Share in terms of numbers (FBS_NUMBER) and in terms of assets (FBS_ASSETS). 
Furthermore, the Foreign Insurance Share for life insurance business (FIS_LIFE) and 
for non-life business (FIS_NONLIFE), both on a premium basis, are considered. Based 
on DE GREGORIO (1999) the average inflation rate (INFL) and the average annual sum 
of exports and imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP (TRADE), both for 
the period 1990 – 1997, are included as control variables. 38  
 
Table 4: Estimation results of financial integration and total factor productivity 
growth 
 Reg7 Reg8 Reg9 Reg10 
Const. -0.00446 
(-1.73) 
-0.00417* 
(-1.93) 
0.00188 
(1.056) 
0.00124 
(0.65) 
INFL 0.03234 
(1.24) 
0.03669 
(1.66) 
0.01192 
(0.45) 
0.01578 
(.556) 
TRADE 0.00141 
(0.45) 
0.00209 
(0.92) 
-0.00685** 
(-2.84) 
-0.00669** 
(-2.63) 
Banking 
 
    
FBS_NUMBER 0.00856 
(1.35) 
   
FBS_ASSETS  0.01689** 
(2.48) 
  
Insurance 
 
    
FIS_LIFE   0.00675 
(1.71) 
 
FIS_NONLIFE    0.00543 
(1.61) 
F-statistic 1.50 3.30* 3.14 2.75 
2R  0.11 0.37 0.42 0.40 
Obs. 13 13 10 9 
Note: The country-specific effect of the re-estimated Reg2 is the dependent variable in all regressions.  
t-statistics are displayed below the coefficients in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% confidence level is indicated with *,**, and *** respectively.  
 
 As the estimation results in table 4 reveal, there is no clear evidence in favour of 
a link between insurance sector integration and growth. The indicator of the foreign 
market share in life insurance markets (FIS_LIFE) is insignificant as is the indicator of 
the foreign market share in non-life insurance markets (FIS_NONLIFE). Deeper inte-
gration in the banking sector has no significant influence on the country-specific effect 
when it is measured solely with the pure number of foreign banks (FBS_NUMBER). In 
contrast, a high foreign bank share is correlated with a high country-specific productiv-
ity effect, when these foreign banks have a significant weight in the domestic banking 
                                             
38  INFL is based on the average annual changes in consumer prices with the base year 1995 and 
is taken from IMF (2000), International Financial Statistics, series 64X. TRADE measures total 
trade in percent of GDP and is obtained from the WORLD BANK (2000).  
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market. This weight of foreign market penetration can be measured in terms of the 
share of assets they own relative to the overall size of the domestic banking market 
(FBS_ASSETS). 
Since the dependent variable reflects the country-specific growth rate of total 
factor productivity, which drives (additionally to investment in the capital stock and 
population growth) the growth rate of GDP per capita, it becomes clear that an in-
crease in the foreign market penetration rises the overall growth rate. In particular, a 
one percent rise of the ratio of bank assets owned by foreign companies adds a "growth 
bonus" of 1.7 percentage points to the overall growth rate of the European economies. 
This growth bonus corresponds almost to the growth bonus the CECCHINI Report at-
tributed to financial market integration. It is worth mentioning that the magnitude of 
the growth bonus seems quite high. For some countries, however, a one percent in-
crease of its foreign bank share already represents a fundamental alteration in the 
market structure. Italy, for example, exhibited between 1990 and 1997 an average for-
eign bank share of only 0.09% in terms of assets .39 After all, the growth bonus should 
not be taken too literally, because due to a significant correlation between different 
integration indicators one can think of the growth bonus as a reaction more to a com-
prehensive rise in the presence of foreign financial companies than solely to an in-
crease in the share of foreign bank assets.  
Indeed, this is not the whole story, because country-specific growth rates of total 
factor productivity have been determined above. As a consequence, the growth bonus 
is conditional on differences in other institutional characteristics captured by the 
country-specific effects. Since all the considered countries show different long-run 
growth rates of total factor productivity, a positive effect of fostered financial integra-
tion alters the long-run growth rates for all economies in the same magnitude of 1.7%, 
but it can not alter the long-run differences between the European economies. Every 
economy profits of a deeper European integration regarding GDP growth, but some 
will profit more than others due to a good institutional infrastructure and other coun-
try characteristics that are also included in the country-specific effects.40 One reason 
for these differences can be seen in differences in the ability to transform enhanced 
financial efficiency into broad macroeconomic efficiency due to variances in the de-
gree of market regulations.  
 
                                             
39  Obviously, the overall average of the foreign bank share 7.8% is dominated by high foreign bank 
shares in Ireland and the United Kingdom. The overall (unweighted) average growth rate of the 
foreign bank share in Europe between 1990 and 1997 amounts to 1.7%, which corresponds ex-
actly to the growth bonus. 
40  The country-specific productivity growth rates after integration are specified in table 6 together 
with the estimation results for the unemployment bonus.  
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4.2.2. Employment bonus of financial market integration  
Complementary to the welfare effects in terms of a shift in the real GDP growth rate 
we attempt to identify labour market effects of European financial integration. Hence, 
we will give an assessment of country-specific relationships between the output growth 
rate and changes in the unemployment rate in the following. The analysis is based on 
a modified version of the famous OKUN´s law. This law can be interpreted in a way 
that an increase in the output growth rate that lies above an unemployment threshold 
("normal" rate of production growth) reduces the unemployment rate.41 We estimate 
country-specific equations of the yearly change in the unemployment rate 
(∆ ) with the GDP growth rate (GRWTH) of the former analysis as explana-
tory variable and c as the regression constant.
itUNEMPL
42 Formally the estimation approach can 
be written as: 
 
(4.1) . ititi1t,iitit GRWTHcUNEMPLUNEMPLUNEMPL ε+β+=−=∆ −
 
The country specific coefficients of the growth rate β  in (4.1) are assumed to be con-
stant in time and expected to have a negative sign. The regression constants c
i
i are used 
to calculate the unemployment threshold under the assumption of no change in the 
unemployment rate as ( . Obviously, an economy must attain a GDP growth 
rate that lies above its normal rate to reduce the actual unemployment rate.
)/c ii β−
43 For the 
US the short-run "OKUN coefficient"  has a magnitude of approximately -0.3, which 
means that a GDP growth rate that lies one percentage point above the normal rate 
reduces the unemployment rate in an order of 0.3 percentage points.  
β
To control for positive autocorrelation in time (persistence of unemployment) 
we include the lagged endogenous variable as a further variable on the right-hand side 
                                             
41  The original work is based on OKUN (1962). Here we do not undertake a serious analysis of the 
employment growth nexus, but understand it as a macroeconomic rule of thumb. For a recent 
survey and new econometric results see DÖPKE (2001). Further discussion and estimations for 
different country samples can be found in LEE (2000) and PADALINO/VIVARELLE (1997).  
42  The unemployment rate UNEMPL measures the share of the labour force of a country that is 
without work, but available for and seeking employment. Definitions of labour force and un-
employment differ by country. The data is taken from OECD (2000) Statistical Compendium, 
General Economic Problems, OECD Economic Outlook, country-specific series. GRWTH meas-
ures per capita GDP growth, defined as before. We use the growth rate of real GDP per capita as 
proxy for output growth, which implies a variation from approaches using the pure output 
growth rate. Since the growth rate of per capita GDP results from  the difference between GDP 
growth and the growth rate of the population this will not be a serious problem. 
43  For the normal rate it is assumed that it includes the sum of productivity growth and growth of 
the labour force. 
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of equation (4.1).44 This method has the additional advantage that it provides long-run 
Okun coefficients. The equation to be estimated can thus be written as:  
 
(4.2) . it1t,iiitiit )UNEMPL(GRWTHcUNEMPL ε+∆γ+β+=∆ −
 
The coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable can be used to calculate the long-
run OKUN-coefficients according to β .)1/( ii γ− 45  
 
Table 5: Estimation results for OKUN´s law in the EU member states  
 C GRWTH ∆ (UNEMPL(-1)) 
Austria 0.29*** 
(3.99) 
-0.07*** 
(-3.47) 
0.14 
(1.12) 
Belgium 0.47*** 
(4.24) 
-0.14*** 
(-4.78) 
0.52*** 
(6.71) 
Denmark 0.80*** 
(6.56) 
-0.31*** 
(-9.29) 
0.39*** 
(5.42) 
Finland 0.98*** 
(8.07) 
-0.29*** 
(-11.56) 
0.41*** 
(7.58) 
France 0.56*** 
(4.63) 
-0.14*** 
(-3.68) 
0.17 
(1.49) 
Germany 0.69*** 
(6.72) 
-0.21*** 
(-7.32) 
0.28*** 
(3.44) 
Greece 0.20 
(1.60) 
-0.04* 
(-1.73) 
0.57*** 
(5.00) 
Ireland 0.94*** 
(3.89) 
-0.22*** 
(-4.78) 
0.13 
(1.20) 
Italy 0.37*** 
(3.32) 
-0.10*** 
(-3.32) 
0.58*** 
(4.96) 
Netherlands 0.67*** 
(4.30) 
-0.32*** 
(-5.38) 
0.57*** 
(6.42) 
Portugal 0.39** 
(2.38) 
-0.09*** 
(-3.24) 
0.52*** 
(4.75) 
Spain 0.67*** 
(3.12) 
-0.17*** 
(-3.86) 
0.62*** 
(7.75) 
Sweden 0.51*** 
(4.93) 
-0.21*** 
(-6.68) 
0.27*** 
(3.22) 
United Kingdom 0.81*** 
(7.69) 
-0.37*** 
(-10.24) 
0.51*** 
(7.85) 
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions  
Sample: 1962 1999; total panel (unbalanced) observations: 512 
Adjusted R-squared: 0.59. 
Note:  is the dependent variable. t-statistics are displayed below the 
coefficients in parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confi-
dence level is indicated with *,**, and ***. 
itUNEMPL∆
 
                                             
44  See GORDON (1984) for this approach.  
45  See SCHALK/UNTIEDT (2000).  
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The results of a SUR estimation of equation (4.2) are shown in table 5.46 With 
regard to the summary statistics the adjusted R2 implies a satisfying explanatory power 
of the model. Except for Greece all short-run OKUN-coefficients of the GDP growth rate 
(GRWTH) are highly significant and show the expected negative sign. Therefore, an 
increase in the GDP growth rate above the normal rate results in a reduction of the 
actual unemployment rate in comparison to the previous period.47 The country-specific 
regression constants, which determine the unemployment threshold imply differences 
in the ability to transform GDP growth into a reduction of unemployment. All con-
stants are statistically significant (except Greece), the normal rates of GDP growth can 
thus be calculated with the assumption . The lagged endogenous 
variables also show the expected positive sign and are all statistically significant with 
the exception of Austria, France and Ireland. Hence, this allows us to calculate the 
long-run OKUN-coefficients for the EU member states .
0UNEMPLit =∆
48  
In Denmark, for instance, an increase in the growth rate above the normal rate 
of 2.6% of one percentage point leads to a decline of the unemployment rate in an or-
der of 0.3 percentage points in the short-run an in an order of 0.5 percentage points in 
the long-run. The average dimension of the short-run "OKUN coefficient" (0.19) is 
smaller than the coefficient for the US (0.3) which might be explained with relatively 
extensive labour market regulations in some EU member states. 
Indeed, the estimation of the country-specific short-run and long-run OKUN-
coefficients serves only as a preliminary finding for the analysis of the employment 
impact of financial integration. With the Okun coefficients we have a useful indicator 
at hand to quantify the welfare gains of a further reduction of European cross-border 
financial barriers in terms of a reduction in the unemployment rate. With the use of 
the country-specific GDP growth effects that we have determined above, we can calcu-
late the country-specific unemployment effects of further integration and quantify the 
employment intensity of the growth bonus.  
In table 6 we bring our main results together. First, the country-specific con-
stants obtained from the most suitable growth regression (Reg2) are displayed. They 
denote the country-specific growth in total factor productivity and exhibit an identical 
shift due to a change in the degree of financial market integration. In particular, all 
growth rates of total factor productivity include the overall growth bonus of 1.7 per-
                                             
46  We use the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) to take both cross-section het-
eroskedasticity and contemporanous correlation into account. We can thus control for macro-
economic shocks that influence the unemployment rates of the European economies in a same 
manner.  
47  We do not control for possible structural breaks due to oil price shocks, the unification shock in 
Germany etc. Furthermore,  we do not include lagged values of the GDP growth rate as addi-
tional regressors. See LÜSCHOW/SCHALK/UNTIEDT (1997) for an alternative approach that in-
cludes these special features.  
48  See table 6 for the computation of the normal rates and the long-run OKUN coefficients.  
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centage points. As a consequence, the first column displays the differences in trans-
forming the overall growth bonus into national shifts of the growth path. Second, the 
table includes the country-specific normal rates of growth as well as the short and long-
run OKUN-coefficients, which are all calculated on the basis of the estimation results 
obtained from table 5. Third, we compute the country-specific short- and long-run un-
employment bonus due to fostered financial market integration.  
 
Table 6: Growth and unemployment bonus of financial market integration  
 Productivity 
Growth 
Nor-
mal 
rate 
Short-run  
OKUN- 
coefficient 
Long-run  
OKUN- 
coefficient 
Short-run 
Unemploy-
ment Bonus 
Long-run 
Unemploy-
ment Bonus 
Austria 1.54 4.20 -0.07 -0.08 -0.12 -0.14 
Belgium 1.85 3.44 -0.14 -0.28 -0.23 -0.47 
Denmark 1.42 2.58 -0.31 -0.51 -0.52 -0.86 
Finland 1.46 3.34 -0.29 -0.50 -0.50 -0.84 
France 1.62 4.10 -0.14 -0.17 -0.23 -0.28 
Germany 1.57 3.32 -0.21 -0.29 -0.35 -0.49 
Greece 1.96 4.69 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 -0.17 
Ireland 2.35 4.27 -0.22 -0.25 -0.37 -0.43 
Italy 1.71 3.64 -0.10 -0.24 -0.17 -0.40 
Netherlands 1.45 2.08 -0.32 -0.76 -0.54 -1.28 
Portugal 1.44 4.22 -0.09 -0.19 -0.16 -0.33 
Spain 1.90 3.98 -0.17 -0.44 -0.28 -0.74 
Sweden 1.61 2.40 -0.21 -0.30 -0.36 -0.50 
UK 1.75 2.20 -0.37 -0.75 -0.62 -1.26 
Notes: Productivity growth includes the sum of the random effects of the re-estimated Reg2 and the 
growth bonus. The normal rates are calculated dividing the constants by the GRWTH-coefficients ob-
tained from table 5. The short-run OKUN-coefficients are equivalent to the GRWTH-coefficients in table 
5. The long-run OKUN-coefficients are calculated according to )i1/(i γ−β ). The country-specific short 
and long-run unemployment bonus is calculated by multiplying the relevant, country-specific OKUN-
coefficient with the growth bonus, which is 1.689 percentage points for every economy.  
 
 The results of table 6 reveal a very differentiated picture of the changes in the 
EU economies due to deeper integration of financial markets. Although the overall 
growth bonus of an increased foreign bank share is of the same magnitude everywhere 
in Europe, some economies like Greece or Ireland are in a better position to transform 
it into a high national total factor productivity growth, because they would experience 
a positive long-run growth even without deeper financial integration. Other economies 
like Denmark or Portugal "need" the growth bonus to compensate for a negative growth 
rate of total factor productivity they would experience without further financial inte-
gration.  
 Concerning the benefits of financial integration in terms of a reduction in un-
employment, we can observe substantial differences as well. There are considerable 
variances in the possibilities to reduce the unemployment rate. On the one hand, some 
economies like Austria will be able to benefit only to a small extent. In Austria a rise 
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in the foreign bank share of one percentage point causes a short-run unemployment 
bonus of -0.12 percentage points. Even in the long-run there will be an unemployment 
bonus of only -0.14 percentage points. On the other hand, the United Kingdom exhib-
its an unemployment bonus of -0.62 percentage points in the short-run and of -1.26 
percentage points in the long-run. These are substantial differences. Hence, differences 
in total factor productivity growth alone are not the only explanation. Rather, exten-
sive variances in labour market conditions have to be considered as well.  
Obviously, a on percent rise in the foreign bank share is not sufficient for any 
European country to reduce unemployment in the short- as well as in the long-run, 
unless it exhibits a growth rate without integration corresponding to its individual 
natural rates. This means, for instance, that Sweden will experience a reduction in the 
unemployment rate due to financial integration only if Sweden’s growth bonus exceeds 
its natural rate, which is 2.4%.  
To summarise, in this section we tried to asses to which extent the European 
economies would gain from a deeper integration in the markets for financial services 
products. We were particularly interested in the growth and employment benefits re-
sulting from an increase in the foreign market shares in the banking and the insur-
ance sector. In a first step we identified a significant influence of the domestic finan-
cial structure to be responsible for the growth of GDP per capita. Since in the long-run 
economic growth is driven by the growth of total factor productivity, we analysed in a 
second step to which extent differences in this growth rate can be contributed to fi-
nancial market integration. Indeed, we observed a growth bonus of fostered foreign 
market penetration in the banking sector. Furthermore, we showed that a growth bo-
nus can be transformed into an employment bonus, but not without considering sub-
stantial country-specific differences due to varying productivity growth rates and la-
bour market conditions. Although we were not able to verify an important contribu-
tion of foreign insurance companies, this does not mean that they play a minor role in 
the further European integration process. We attribute this expectation primary to 
measurement problems of foreign insurance companies.  
Of course, the estimation results should not be read - as always - without reser-
vations. In the first step only one of the six financial indicators was able to show a 
convincing correlation between the monetary and the real economic sector. In the sec-
ond step, due to data limitations, financial market integration was only considered in 
a way that was strongly connected with foreign direct investment in the banking and 
insurance sector. Other strategies of financial integration were not analysed. For in-
stance, we did not account for the increasing importance of e-banking, i.e. offering 
services on the Internet in different European economies, or for integration in the in-
vestment funds business. Furthermore, in the second step substantial econometric re-
strictions are required, because we only had a maximum of thirteen observations at 
hand in all four regression.  
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5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to highlight some aspects of the growth and employment 
benefits the European economies will experience when integration in the markets for 
financial service products is spurred. We followed a theoretical as well as an empirical 
approach to make predictions about a growth and employment bonus.  
In the growth model presented in section 2 we demonstrated that enhanced 
cross-border activities of banking and insurance companies increase the overall growth 
rate unambiguously when the amount of savings channelled into investment increases. 
Hence, it should be clear that without a functioning domestic market for financial ser-
vice products, deeper integration will not result in higher growth rates for per capita 
income.  
In section 3 major steps towards an integrated financial market in Europe were 
summarised and contrasted with the empirical evidence. On the one hand, it was 
shown that in the last 30 years substantial steps have been made to integrate the 
European financial markets. On the other hand, the descriptive analysis of foreign 
market penetration in banking and insurance markets already revealed the existence 
of remaining obstacles to cross-border businesses. The picture of integration in the 
European markets for financial services drawn from indicators of the banking and 
insurance sector was not very precise. Nevertheless, we concluded that the degree of 
integration in financial markets in Europe is far away from reflecting a "Single Market 
for Financial Services". Some attempts to abolish these obstacles are implemented in 
the Financial Services Action Plan adopted by the European Commission. This Action 
Plan outlines a series of policy objectives and specific measures to improve the frame-
work for a functioning single market for financial services. In the Action Plan the 
European Commission formulates policy priorities and time-scales for legislative and 
other measures to push financial integration priorities. Therefore, the Financial Ser-
vices Action Plan can bee seen as a significant step towards faster and deeper Euro-
pean financial integration. Nevertheless, financial companies should be aware of time 
lags concerning the implementation of the strategic objectives into community law. 
Furthermore, some major obstacles to cross-border financial activities are not suffi-
ciently included in the Financial Services Action Plan. 
In our empirical evaluation we estimated in a first step typical growth equations 
with different indicators of financial market development on the right hand side. The 
results from these regressions reveal a significant positive correlation between the 
overall growth rate and the extent to which the financial market is developed meas-
ured by its structure. The evidence provided by the regression results of a correlation 
between financial market integration and total factor productivity growth in the sec-
ond step is ambiguous. However, we identified a weak influence of foreign market 
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penetration in the sector for banking products. Hence, deeper financial integration 
generates a growth bonus. In the context of the theoretical examinations this growth 
bonus does not only mean a more rapid convergence speed to the steady-state ("neo-
classical growth effect") but also a higher equilibrium growth rate in the long run ("en-
dogenous growth effect"). 
In contrast to the results of the influential CECCHINI-Report we are able to dis-
tinguish between an "overall" growth bonus and country-specific differences to trans-
form this growth bonus into a shift of total factor productivity growth. Hence, the long-
run growth effect is conditional on differences in institutional characteristics captured 
by country-specific effects. As a possible explanation for these differences one might 
see remaining variances in the degree of national market regulations in the banking 
and insurance business. As a consequence, political activities should promote both the 
deregulation of national financial markets and the deregulation of cross-border finan-
cial activities to generate a positive growth bonus. The first recommendation aims at a 
deeper implementation of existing community laws into national legal frameworks. In 
addition, new European laws should be established on a supra-national level that 
abolish remaining obstacles to pan-European financial strategies and are better suited 
for enhanced world-wide competition in financial markets. 
In a third step we supplemented the analysis of the macroeconomic growth ef-
fects with an analysis of the link between financial integration and unemployment. To 
assess the potential benefits of a fostered financial integration we estimate country-
specific OKUN-coefficients, which provide information about the growth rate a country 
needs to attain to reduce unemployment. We showed that the growth bonus can be 
transformed into an employment bonus, but not without considering significant coun-
try-specific differences. These differences are substantial. Hence, differences in total 
factor productivity growth alone are not the only explanation, rather extensive vari-
ances in labour market conditions have to be considered as well. We showed that there 
must be a convincing increase in financial market integration to generate a growth 
bonus that can substantially reduce unemployment in the EU member states.  
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